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This teaching case introduces students to a relatively simple approach to identifying and documenting security requirements 
within conceptual models that are commonly taught in systems analysis and design courses. An introduction to information 
security is provided, followed by a classroom example of a fictitious company, Fun & Fitness, in the process of updating its e-
Commerce site for class registrations. The case illustrates how UML class diagrams can be used for information classification, 
data input validation, and regulatory compliance considerations; how a UML use case diagram can be transformed into a 
“misuse case” diagram to identify threats and countermeasures to functional use cases; and how a data flow diagram may be 
used to analyze and document threats and countermeasures to data stores, data flows, processes, and external entities using the 
STRIDE approach developed by Microsoft. The case is geared toward a systems analyst who does not have former training in 
IS security, and is suitable for upper-division undergraduate and graduate courses. 
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Reducing information security vulnerabilities in software is a 
daunting task that organizations face today. Industry reports 
on information security breaches indicate that web 
applications remain a persistent target for attacks (Hewlett-
Packard Development Company 2011). In a study by the 
Ponemon Institute (2012b) on application security, 
developers cited mobile applications as the most likely to 
disrupt their organizations’ business operations, yet 65% of 
those surveyed indicated that mobile applications in their 
organizations are not tested. Of the 256 developers surveyed 
in the study, 79% indicated their organizations had no or an 
inefficient, ad-hoc process for building security into their 
applications, and 71% believed that security was not 
adequately covered in the systems development lifecycle 
(SDLC) within their organizations. Thus, information 
systems (IS) security at the application-level is needed, yet 
under-developed, ultimately contributing to expensive data 
breaches.  
According to the Ponemon Institute (2012a), data 
breaches cost the average firm $194 USD for each customer 
record compromised and $5.5 million USD per incident. In 
the widely-referenced annual Verizon Data Breach 
Investigations Report2  (2013), financial motives accounted 
for 75% of their investigated data breaches, with financial 
payments and user credentials being the most targeted data 
types. In spite of the high costs of data breach notifications 
when personal information has been compromised, less than 
35% of respondents in a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers 




(2013) believed their organizations had an accurate inventory 
of where personal data for employees and customers are 
collected, transmitted, and stored – making it less likely that 
these data will be adequately protected.  
These findings suggest that the time is ripe for IS 
professionals to begin incorporating security into the analysis 
and design of an IS as a means to reduce security 
vulnerabilities and data breaches. While leading security 
frameworks for integrating security into the SDLC advocate 
planning for security during software initiation (NIST 2008) 
and integrating security into software design (Microsoft 
2010), guidance is limited on how security may be integrated 
into the “analysis” phase of the SDLC as systems analysts 
gather system requirements. Therefore, this teaching case is 
focused on integrating security into conceptual (i.e., logical) 
models developed in the analysis and early design phases of 
the SDLC (see Figure 1) while systems analysts gather 
functional requirements. In doing so, security will be more 
tightly integrated into system design. Moreover, conceptual 
models that incorporate security can lay a foundation from 
which systems developers, systems engineers, and security 
professionals can build upon in subsequent design, 
development, implementation, and maintenance phases of 
the SDLC. 
System modeling has traditionally focused on functional 
requirements (i.e., what the system should do), typically 
excluding security requirements (i.e., what and how the 
system should protect). Though computer scientists have 
proposed adding security to UML use case diagrams (Sindre 
and Opdahl 2000; 2008) and modeling security requirements 
for specific types of applications such as web applications 
(Salini and Kanmani 2013) or specific system types such as 
distributed systems (Uzunov et al. 2012), these methods have 
not been widely adapted in IS systems analysis and design 
courses. Indeed, scant coverage of security has been found in 
systems analysis and design textbooks (Biros et al. 2007; 
Parrish et al. 2009). In absence of including security earlier 
in the SDLC, security as part of systems development is 
reactionary and typically “bolted on” during system 
implementation or maintenance (Parrish et al. 2009; 
Ponemon Institute 2012b; van Wyk and McGraw 2005), at 
which point it may be cost prohibitive to make significant 
security design changes.  
Even if practitioners wanted to address security earlier in 
the SDLC, it is likely that many practitioners do not know 
how to incorporate security into modeling techniques (Mead 
and McGraw 2005; Uzunov et al. 2012) as part of 
requirements gathering. To that end, this teaching case 
introduces students to a relatively simple approach to 
identifying and documenting security requirements within 
conceptual models that are commonly taught in systems 
analysis and design courses. In particular, this teaching case 
illustrates how to elicit security requirements from object-
oriented UML use case and class diagrams, and from 
structured data flow diagrams. 
This teaching case is geared toward information systems 
analysts. For the purpose of this article, systems analysts 
refer to students and practitioners who work on the analysis 
and design of business information systems, including 
identifying system functionality, and analyzing or designing 
business process workflows, user/system interfaces, and data 
attributes. System architecture and network security are 





Figure 1: Modeling within the SDLC 
 
2. SYSTEMS ANALYSTS AND IS SECURITY 
 
On a systems development project, systems analysts work 
with system users to model business processes, identify 
functional system requirements, and design both logical and 
physical solutions; thus, systems analysts possess valuable 
analytical skills that are often applied in a business context. 
We suggest that systems analysts’ knowledge of business 
processes, coupled with their skill in modeling those 
processes, places them in a unique position to incorporate 
security as part of the conceptualization of IS requirements. 
As systems analysts collect a vast amount of system data 
from forms, interviews, observations, and other sources 
during requirements gathering, they can also identify and 
conceptually model information classifications, access 
control requirements, and risk tolerance levels (Biros et al. 
2007), among other security and privacy considerations.  
While the roles of systems developers, systems 
engineers, security analysts, and security architects are 
important in the creation of secure software, their impact is 
more in the physical design of the code and architecture, 
when physical models are developed (see Figure 1). In 
contrast, the role that is among the most likely to work with 
users on conceptual (logical) modeling of a business process 
during system analysis is the systems analyst. While a 
systems analyst may not typically be the best role to define 
firewall specifications, it is among the best roles in the IS/IT 
organization to work with users and other stakeholders to 
conceptualize security requirements within a business 
process. Just as user participation is essential to eliciting 
functional business requirements for an IS, user participation 
is also essential to eliciting requirements for protecting 
information within business processes given their knowledge 
of information usage (Spears and Barki 2010). 
 
3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFICATION 
PROCESS 
 
In this section, we present a 4-step process for identifying 
security requirements that will subsequently be illustrated in 
a classroom example. This approach was described by 
Tondel, Jaatum and Meland (2008) based on a literature 
review they conducted on various approaches to security 
requirements engineering. The approach is intended to be 
“palatable to regular software developers” (as opposed to 
security experts), because “all software development projects 
need a well-balanced amount of security awareness right 
from the beginning” (p. 20). The 4-step process includes:  
1. Identify security objectives  




2. Identify information assets 
3. Identify threats to information assets 
4. Document security requirements  
We begin our process description by introducing the 
systems analyst to basic security concepts. Information 
security is defined as the preservation of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information; in addition, other 
properties, such as authenticity, accountability, non-
repudiation, and reliability can also be involved (ISO/IEC 
27002 2005). Confidentiality refers to restricting access to 
information to only those who are authorized to have access. 
Integrity refers to protecting information and information 
systems from corruption, damage, or destruction. 
Availability refers to ensuring a system is available for 
access by authorized personnel when needed. 
Security requirements identification begins with 
identifying the security objectives that you wish to achieve. 
A security objective is defined as a goal that you wish to 
achieve with respect to securing an information system. 
Examples of security objectives might be regulatory 
compliance or adherence to industry security standards.  
The second step is to identify information assets as a 
means to prioritize security efforts. An asset is something of 
value to an organization. An information asset may be data, 
hardware, software, process, or people. Consider an asset’s 
value from the perspective of the customer, system owner, 
and potential attacker (Tondel et al. 2008).   
Third, threats to information assets are identified. An IS 
security threat is a potential cause of an unwanted incident, 
which may result in harm to a system or organization. 
Threats may be intentional or unintentional, and may 
originate from external or internal sources. For example, an 
employee can accidentally or intentionally implement 
programming code that crashes a production server. Another 
example of a threat is an attack by a hacker. A hacker is an 
external agent who intentionally circumvents security 
measures. A vulnerability is an existing weakness within the 
computing environment that may be exploited. 
Various approaches to gathering security requirements 
differ on the extent to which requirements include concrete 
security measures (Tondel et al. 2008). However, as part of 
threat analysis in this teaching case, we also identify security 
measures to counter the identified threats. A 
countermeasure (also referred to as a safeguard or control) 
is any policy, technology, or procedure designed to detect, 
prevent, or reduce a security threat. A common 
countermeasure is a security policy. A security policy is a 
stated set of security objectives along with some set of 
mechanisms for ensuring those objectives are met. For 
example if we wish to prevent unauthorized persons from 
accessing an IS (objective), we may have a policy that 
requires all system users to authenticate (i.e., verify their 
identity) to the system using a user ID and password 
(mechanism). Having a person authenticate to the system 
also helps to enforce the principle of non-repudiation, which 
is a way to guarantee that the sender of a message cannot 
later deny having sent the message and that the recipient 
cannot deny having received the message (webopedia.com).   
Finally, the fourth step in the risk identification process 
is to document the security requirements identified in earlier 
steps. Security requirements may be documented alongside 
functional system requirements. In doing so, security 
requirements will gain visibility among stakeholders viewing 
requirements documentation. Similar to functional 
requirements, security requirements can be prioritized and 
included in traceability matrices and test scripts. In other 
words, security requirements become part of system 
requirements. 
 
4. APPLICABILITY OF THIS TEACHING CASE 
 
This teaching case is particularly suited to students majoring 
in information systems and is applicable to both upper-
division undergraduate and graduate courses. We have 
taught conceptual modeling of IS security risk in both a 
systems analysis course that is typically taken as the first 
course in a Masters-level IS degree program, and in an 
elective organizational modeling course. Students are 
initially taught how to construct common types of diagrams 
used in systems analysis and design, such as various types of 
UML diagrams, data flow diagrams (DFD), entity-
relationship diagrams (ERD), etc. After students have gained 
an understanding of conceptual modeling, they are then 
taught how to extend their diagrams by adding security and 
privacy risk considerations. For this teaching case, a basic 
understanding of conceptual modeling techniques is 
assumed, such as how to create a DFD, use case, or class 
diagram.  
In teaching conceptual modeling of IS security threats and 
countermeasures in use case diagrams, referred to as misuse 
case diagrams, we have found that IS students not only grasp 
how to conceptualize risk within a business process, misuse 
case diagrams are commonly named the diagram students 
most enjoy creating. Students have expressed enjoying the 
mental exercise of de-constructing a business process in an 
effort to consider where the process may break down or 
otherwise result in loss. Several students working in industry 
as systems or risk analysts stated they like the visual 
communication that misuse case diagrams enable with their 
system users, since information security is challenging for 
analysts to explain and difficult for their users to grasp. 
Thus, diagrams are an effective communications medium. 
 
5. CLASSROOM EXAMPLE 
 
Imagine that you are a systems analyst at Fun & Fitness, Inc. 
working on systems analysis and design for an e-Commerce 
system revision. After conducting a series of meetings with 
key users and reviewing existing system artifacts, you’ve 
learned the Company Background, provided in a narrative 
below. Next, a UML use case diagram is constructed to 
model an understanding of the core business objectives and 
functionality of the system. Conceptual models provide a 
means for an analyst to gain a greater understanding of the 
problem domain and to communicate that understanding 
with system stakeholders. The Fun & Fitness case then 
continues with an illustration of the 4-step process for 
security requirements identification. 
 
5.1 Learning Objectives 
1. Identify security requirements as part of systems 
requirements gathering. 




2. Raise student awareness of security requirements in 
systems development projects. 
 
5.2 Company Background 
Fun & Fitness offers a variety of instructor-led, exercise 
classes, such as yoga, Zumba, pilates, etc. On the Fun & 
Fitness e-commerce web site, a customer can view the 
exercise class schedule. Class registration is accessible from 
the schedule, though it is possible that a customer may view 
the schedule without registering for a class.  Both members 
and non-members (collectively referred to as “customers”) 
may view the class schedule and register for an exercise 
class. Approximately 60 percent of Fun & Fitness customers 
are members. Incentives for membership include reduced 
prices on exercise classes. 
The scheduling manager establishes an attendance limit 
for each exercise class based on class popularity, room 
availability, and input from the marketing and accounting 
managers.  Attendance limits are typically set at 20 or 30 
people. Class registrations may be made online in advance 
up to 1 hour before the scheduled class time, or at the door. 
Several popular exercise classes fill up quickly, so customers 
are encouraged to register for classes online in advance. The 
class registration page shows the class attendance limit and 
the number of people currently registered. Unfortunately, 
customers often register for a class, but ultimately do not 
attend the class. Though the current web site allows 
customers to register for a class after registrations have 
exceeded the attendance limit, prospective customers visiting 
the online fitness schedule may assume the class is full, and 
thus no longer available. Consequently, Fun & Fitness may 
be losing potential income if customers choose not to register 
or attend a class because they perceive the class to be full to 
capacity and unable to accept additional registrations. In this 
way, scheduling, forecasting, and potential revenue are 
hampered. In an effort to improve scheduling, forecasting, 
and potential revenue, Fun & Fitness management has 
decided to require payment at the time of registration. In 
other words, a customer cannot register for a class unless 
payment is made. 
Online payments are made by customer credit card. 
Verification and processing of credit card transactions are 
handled by an external credit card processing vendor’s 
system. Upon successful completion of a credit card 
payment, the customer is sent an email confirmation, and a 
financial log is updated with accounting information to be 
exported to Fun & Fitness’ accounting system. 
When a customer pays for class registration, he or she is 
not required to have an online account with Fun & Fitness. 
However, only members are able to access membership 
account information online. Members are able to manage 
account information online, such as updating email and street 
addresses, etc. Members must log into their account to view 
or update account information. 
On average, members take 2.5 exercise classes per week. 
As a convenience to members, credit card payment 
information may be stored as part of the member’s account 
information in order to save time by eliminating the need to 
re-enter payment information each time a member registers 
for a class. The number of classes taken by non-members 
varies widely, from only one to many. Currently, only 
members are allowed to store payment information. In recent 
months, several non-members who reportedly take several 
classes a year have requested the ability to store credit card 
payment information so that they do not have to reenter this 
information every time they register for a Fun & Fitness 
exercise class. The Fun & Fitness management team is 
considering the implications of this request, and has not yet 
decided if non-members will be allowed to store payment 
information. From a data security and regulatory compliance 
perspective, what are the implications, if any, of 
accommodating this request? What is gained or lost by Fun 
& Fitness from a benefit-risk perspective? 
Finally, the marketing analysts email customers discount 
promotions for exercise classes. A customer can “opt out” of 
receiving promotional emails. The marketing manager 
approves all promotional emails before they are sent to 
customers. The marketing manager also generates various 
reports. 
 
6. USER INTERACTION WITH SYSTEM 
FUNCTIONALITY IN A USE CASE DIAGRAM 
 
The use case diagram in Figure 2 summarizes system 
functionality requirements from a user’s perspective.  A use 
case description may be used to define more detail on the 
actors, triggers, outcomes, and sequential tasks associated 
with a given use case in the diagram. For this teaching case, 
we are not including use case descriptions. Next, we 
illustrate an informal, relatively simple 4-step process for 
including security in system requirements identification. 
 
7. STEP ONE: IDENTIFY SECURITY OBJECTIVES  
 
Security objectives are high-level requirements or goals that 
are most important to internal and external customers, 
including requirements for compliance with relevant 
legislation, policies, and standards (Tondel et al. 2008). 
Security objectives may be identified by interviewing 
relevant stakeholders and consulting organizational policies 
and industry standards. In the remainder of this section, we 
provide an overview of security-related regulations 
applicable to Fun & Fitness. 
 
7.1. Payment Card Industry’s Data Security Standard 
(PCI DSS)  
Fun & Fitness must comply with PCI DSS because it 
accepts credit card payments. PCI DSS is an industry 
standard that was developed by a council on behalf of 5 
credit card companies: Visa, MasterCard, American Express, 
JCB, and Discover. Any organization that accepts, transmits, 
or processes credit card payments with these card brands 
must comply with PCI DSS; otherwise, the organization 
faces significant fees from its bank(s). The purpose of PCI 
DSS is to protect “cardholder” data. To that end, PCI DSS 
contains 12 security requirements related to cardholder data 
storage and transmission (PCI Security Standards Council 
2010). 
For the purposes of this teaching case, we focus on PCI 
DSS Requirements 3 and 4 that are associated with the goal 
to Protect Cardholder Data, while stored and in transit. These  






Figure 2. Use Case Diagram for Fun & Fitness E-Commerce System 
 
 
requirements state that cardholder authentication data (e.g., 
CVV2 code) are not to be stored; minimal, if any, cardholder 
account data (e.g., number and expiration date) should be 
stored; cardholder data that is stored must be encrypted; and 
cardholder data must be encrypted during transmission. PCI 
DSS also requires strong access control measures for 
cardholder data, and an organization must have an 
information security policy. In complying with PCI DSS, an 
organization needs to determine which business processes 
handle cardholder data; where is cardholder data located; 
should the data be retained; how to manage encryption; and 
who should have access. Policies should then be 
documented. 
 
7.2. Breach Notification Laws 
Over 40 U.S. states require an organization to notify 
individuals when the organization has experienced a data 
breach involving personally identifiable information (PII) of 
individuals residing in a given state. Notification is not 
required if data are encrypted (e.g., on a stolen laptop), and 
thus, unreadable. Several international governments are 
considering similar legislation. Though the definition of PII 
varies by governing entity, it generally refers to a person’s 
name when combined with any one of the following: email 
address, postal address, financial account number, driver’s 
license number, or social security number. 
 
7.3. Fair Information Practices  
Several governments worldwide recognize a set of “fair 
information practices” designed to aid privacy protection 
(e.g., U.S. FTC 2007). These practices are mandated by 
some governments (e.g., the European Union), and voluntary 
by others (e.g., the U.S.). For the purposes of this teaching 
case, we bring to your attention the fair information practices 
of notice (i.e., an individual should know what personal 
information is collected on him/her, by whom, and how it is 
used); and choice (i.e., an individual should be able to opt 
out of personal information collection). In e-commerce, 
notice is typically provided by privacy notices posted on an 
organization’s web site, preferably on the home page and 
pages where personal information is collected (Culnan and 
Carlin 2009). 
 
8. STEP TWO: IDENTIFY INFORMATION ASSETS 
 
Review the case narrative (or interview notes and other 
sources of input on system requirements for a real project). 
Review any use case diagrams, use case descriptions, and 
class diagram. From this input, identify the key assets of this 
system. In other words, what are the objects or attributes that 
are particularly valuable to Fun & Fitness? Value may be 
tangible, such as financial gain or loss, or intangible, such as 
reputation gain or loss. If assets are identified that were not 
originally captured in your class diagram, it may be 
necessary to add them, as appropriate. We have identified the 
following assets: 
 
• Credit card information 
• Customer email list 
• Exercise fitness class schedule 
• Financial transaction 
• Marketing promotion 
 
If customer names, along with their credit card 
(“cardholder”) information or email addresses are breached, 
regulatory requirements mandate that customers be notified. 
Such notification would result in a financial costs incurred, 
and may possibly have a negative impact on the company’s 
reputation, including potentially losing customers. An 
accurate and available class schedule has a direct impact on 




company revenue in terms of customers’ ability to register 
for classes. The reliability of financial data is critical to 
investors and the government, and marketing promotions can 
provide a competitive advantage. For these reasons, these 
data have been classified as information assets. 
 
8.1 Information Classification 
Information classification is closely related to asset 
identification and is a critical first step to identifying 
information that an organization wants to protect. 
Information should be protected according to its 
classification. Otherwise, resources may be wasted in 
implementing unnecessary controls or sensitive information 
may go unprotected. The classification of data attributes is 
generally based on an organization’s industry, internal 
operations, risk tolerance, and regulatory requirements. 
Common classifications are shown in Table 1, though an 
organization may use different names or have additional 
classifications. 
 
Classification Description Example 
Public Information is 
publicly available 
and would not 
cause harm to the 
organization if 
disclosed 




and past marketing 
promotions 






operations, and is 





customer ID (other 
than a government 
issued identifier) 
Confidential Sensitive 
information that if 
disclosed, 
compromised or 

















Table 1. Sample Information Classification 
 
Consensus is needed among organizational stakeholders 
on what classification to assign information, as well as the 
lifecycle of the classification. For example, should marketing 
promotions be classified? At some point, the promotion 
becomes public knowledge; however, an organization may 
want to keep their promotions secret until ready for release. 
In such case, a marketing promotion may be classified as 
Confidential from inception until release date, and then re-
classified as Public on the release date. Certain aspects of the 
promotion may be Confidential, while other details are For 
Internal Use Only. The same logic applies to the 
classification lifecycle of sales revenue reported in financial 
statements.  
In addition to gaining consensus, information 
classification must be communicated to all internal members 
who have access to information classified beyond Public. 
Otherwise, one employee may consider a particular type of 
data as confidential, while another does not. For example, is 
a birthdate or phone number considered to be personal 
information? Is employee salary officially considered to be 
confidential? The answer to both questions depends on how 
an organization chooses to classify its data. If any of these 
data attributes are deemed confidential, measures should be 
implemented to protect confidentiality, such as more 
controlled access, encryption, etc. In some cases, an 
organizational member may not want to classify certain data 
as confidential in order to alleviate cumbersome security 
controls. Again, consensus and communication are needed 
within the organization on information classification. Once 
information has been classified, security resources can be 
more effectively allocated by only focusing on protecting 
those information assets that process or store confidential 
information.  
We propose using a UML class diagram as a means to 
define and communicate information classifications. In 
addition to classifying information as public, for internal use, 
or confidential, a UML class diagram can also be used to 
identify data attributes that fall within the scope of regulatory 
requirements. By classifying information, appropriate 
controls may be considered. 
Create a class diagram for the Fun & Fitness e-
Commerce class registration system:  
 
1. Identify classes (objects) within the e-Commerce system. 
 
2. For each class, identify its attributes (e.g., based on the 
case narrative above and attributes you believe are 
necessary within the context of this IS). 
 
3. For each class, identify those attributes that are 
confidential and denote with “CONF” in the attribute 
name. Attributes with particular regulatory constraints 
may be denoted with “REG” in the attribute name.  
 
4. For each class, identify operations (called methods in 
physical models). Do not include operations that are 
available to all classes, such as create(), edit() and 
delete() an instance.  
 
5. For each attribute that was identified as confidential, add 
an operation to that class for encryption(). 
 
6. For each attribute of each class, determine if a validation 
check is needed. If so, include the validation as an 
operation with a parameter list of attributes, or the “all” 
parameter (described next). 
 
 






Figure 3. Class Diagram with Data Classification, Validation, and Compliance Requirements 
 
 
8.2 Additional Uses of Class Diagrams in Security 
Requirements Identification 
Identifying requirements for data input validation may also 
be facilitated in a UML class diagram (or an entity-
relationship diagram). Many of the web program code 
vulnerabilities are related to un-validated input. For example, 
a web page may allow a system user to key in his or her 
login ID and password. If this input is not validated, a 
security vulnerability (i.e., weakness) is created that could 
allow someone to input and send remote commands to the 
database server. This example illustrates a SQL command 
injection vulnerability, which is a technique used to take 
advantage of non-validated input vulnerabilities to pass SQL 
commands through a web application for execution by a 
backend database. 
Therefore, a data attribute should be validated if it will 
be entered by a system user or transmitted from a system 
interface. Validation requirements can be captured in a class 
diagram as an operation at the attribute or the class level. If 
the entire class is created from user input (e.g., a customer 
account information), a validation() operation can include 
“all” as the parameter to validate all attributes. Otherwise, if 
individual attributes within a class require validation, include 
relevant attribute names as parameters in a validation 
operation; the Promo_code attribute in the Class Registration 
class is an example. 
9. STEP THREE: IDENTIFY THREATS WITH A 
MISUSE CASE DIAGRAM 
 
A use case diagram depicts how stakeholders (called 
“actors”) interact with a system, and the desired system 
functionality from the stakeholder’s perspective. Conversely, 
a misuse case diagram provides a means to model 
undesirable system events that threaten successful 
completion of the system functions that were modeled as use 
cases (Sindre and Opdahl 2008). If a business function 
carried out within a system is viewed as an organizational 
objective and represented as a use case, then a misuse case 
depicts a threat to an organizational objective. That is, while 
use cases illustrate desirable system functionality, misuse 
cases illustrate undesirable events that could occur and 
disrupt the desirable system functionality. In a misuse case 
diagram, threats are modeled as misuse cases, threat agents 
as mis-actors, mitigating controls that counter the specified 
threats as use cases, and the associations between these 
components (Sindre and Opdahl 2000; 2008). Just as use 
case diagrams are particularly useful when analyzing a 
business process where stakeholder interaction is of primary 
interest, misuse case diagrams are particularly useful when 
analyzing data security threats posed by stakeholders. 
 
 






Figure 4. Misuse Case Diagram 
Green = business objectives; Yellow = threats to business objectives; White = countermeasures 
 
 
Construct a misuse case diagram for the Fun & Fitness e-
Commerce system: 
 
1. Review the use cases and actors in your original use case 
diagram.  
 
2. For each use case, consider “what could go wrong” to 
prevent this use case from successful completion. These 
undesirable events are threats and are notated as misuse 
cases in your diagram. Given space constraints, include the 
more important misuse cases: those that have a reasonable 
likelihood of occurrence and would have a potentially 
significant impact. Color-code misuse cases in the model to 
distinguish them from use cases. Be sure to name each 
misuse case such that it explicitly and clearly indicates the 
threat. Start the name with a verb.  
 
3. Identify and include in your diagram the mis-actor(s) that 
would interact with (e.g., initiate or perform) each misuse 
case. Draw associations between mis-actors and misuse 
cases. Color-code the mis-actors in the model to distinguish 
them from actors. One example is to apply a green 
background for use cases, a yellow background for misuse 
cases, and a white background for countermeasures (Spears 
2012). Note that an actor may also be a mis-actor, so would 
be modeled twice in the diagram and color-coded 
accordingly. It may also improve readability to list actors 
separately from mis-actors. For example, in Figure 4, the 
actors are located on the left side of the diagram, while mis-
actors are on the right. Secondly, the mis-actor “authorized 
system user” does not distinguish any particular internal role, 
but instead implies that anyone with legitimate system access 
could falsify reported revenue, intentionally or 
unintentionally. 
 
4. Identify and include in your diagram “countermeasures” 
that would “prevent” or “detect” the misuse from occurring. 
These countermeasures are modeled as use cases and are to 
be included in the diagram in an organized manner. For 
example, the misuse case diagram in Figure 4 lists use cases 
on the left side, misuse cases on right, and countermeasures 
in the middle of the diagram. You may decide to organize 
your diagram differently; what is important is to clearly 
distinguish between functional use cases, countermeasure 
use cases, and misuse cases, as well as aid diagram 
readability by placing diagram elements in an organized 
manner. 
 
5. Draw associations as applicable between functional use 
cases, countermeasure use cases, and misuse cases. Label 
each association line as appropriate to indicate “include”, 
“extend”, “threaten”, “prevent”, or “detect”. For example, 
the countermeasure use case “audit reported revenue” is used 
to detect falsified reported revenue, and the “post privacy 
notice” use case is intended to prevent a lack of customer 
trust in relation to storing credit card data. 
 
6. Evaluate the logical soundness of your diagram and 
descriptions. For example, does your diagram fit the context 
of the business case? Have major threats related to the case 
narrative been identified and modeled as misuse cases? Do 




the threats relate to the use cases? Would the countermeasure 
logically prevent or detect the threat? 
 
7. (optional) Document each misuse case by adapting a use 
case description to fit its misuse case. For example, in place 
of documenting a normal flow of procedures as one would 
for a use case, in a misuse case description, document a 
threat scenario and a description of how the countermeasure 
addresses the threat.  
 
In introducing misuse case diagrams to students or 
system stakeholders, it may be helpful to construct a table to 
facilitate the discussion, and then transform the table 
contents into a diagram. As shown in Table 2, the first 
column of the table contains each use case in the initial use 
case diagram. For each use case, ask “What could go wrong 
to prevent this use case from executing successfully?” The 
answers become potential misuse cases. For each misuse 
case, ask what mis-actor might implement or perform the 
misuse case. Finally, for the fourth column, discuss 
prospective countermeasures for each misuse case. 
Constructing this table generates interesting discussion, 
including a variety of ideas. Students begin to get 





















   
Pay for 
fitness class 
   
Etc.    
 
Table 2. MAC (Misuse-actor-countermeasure) Table 
 
In the misuse case diagram in Figure 4, six misuse cases 
were identified. As you can see, misuse case diagrams can 
get very busy. However, they reveal and communicate 
valuable information by highlighting IS security and privacy 
threats and countermeasures. Importantly, they prompt 
discussion among the systems development team and system 
users on system risk. Given space constraints, not all threats 
and countermeasures can be captured in a misuse case. 
Capture the most important elements and document 
remaining items from discussions with stakeholders. 
 
10. STEP THREE: IDENTIFY THREATS WITH DATA 
FLOW DIAGRAMS 
 
In this section, we illustrate an approach to threat and 
countermeasure identification that was developed by 
Microsoft using data flow diagrams (DFD). STRIDE is an 
acronym of information security threat categories (see Table 
3): spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, 
denial of service, and elevation of privilege. STRIDE 
dictates that each element in a DFD is susceptible to some or 
all of these threat categories, as shown in Table 4. For 
example, an external entity (which STRIDE refers to as an 
external interactor) is susceptible to spoofing and non-





Spoofing Pretending to be someone or 
something that one is not 
Tampering Making unauthorized changes to 
data at rest or in transit 
Repudiation Taking actions that cannot be traced 
back to the person that took them 
Information 
Disclosure 
Gaining access to data in transit or 
at rest that one is  not meant to have 
access to 
Denial of Service Interrupting the normal, legitimate 
operations of a system 
Elevation of 
Privilege 
Gaining more system access 
privileges than intended, resulting in 
the ability to perform unauthorized 
actions 
 
Table 3. Elements of STRIDE 
 
In conducting a threat analysis using the STRIDE 
approach, the analyst creates a DFD of the system. Each 
DFD element can then be analyzed to identify potential 
threats and countermeasures. We used Microsoft’s Security 
Development Lifecycle (SDL) Threat Modeling Tool3 that is 
a free add-on to Microsoft Visio. The SDL Threat Modeling 
Tool is designed for threat analysis using the STRIDE 
technique and helps to facilitate the analysis. The SDL 
Threat Modeling Tool is designed for threat analysis using 
the STRIDE technique and will help facilitate the analysis. 
The tool provides guiding questions to help the analyst think 
about threats associated with a DFD element.  If you are not 
using the SDL Threat Modeling Tool, use the information in 
Table 4 below to guide your analysis. 
 
DFD Element S T R I D E 
External Entity x  x    
Process x x x x x x 
Data Flow  x  x x  
Data Store  x x x x  
 
Table 4. DFD Elements and their STRIDE 
Susceptibilities (adapted from Hernan et al. 2006) 
 
Perform a threat analysis with STRIDE in a DFD: 
 
1. Re-read the Fun & Fitness case and use the information 
to create a DFD of the system. 
 
2. Brainstorm the major types of threats that are associated 
with each element in the DFD (external entities, data flows, 
processes, data stores) using STRIDE.   




















































































Figure 5: Level-0 DFD for Fun & Fitness E-Commerce System 
 
3. Document threats and countermeasures for each DFD 
element using the SDL Threat Analysis add-on tool for 
Microsoft Visio. Alternatively, document in word processing 
software. 
 
The DFD in Figure 5 depicts how data flows through the 
Fun & Fitness e-Commerce System.  It shows us data input 
into the system from external entities; how data flows 
between system processes; data storage within the system; 
and the system’s outputs.   
Next, we illustrate a STRIDE analysis for a DFD 
process. For example, let’s imagine that you are 
brainstorming threats for the “Register/Pay for Fitness Class” 
process.  You might ask the following questions: 
 
Spoofing 
 Can someone register for a class without providing 
identification (name, email address, and payment) 
information? 
 Can someone use a credit card without providing 
sufficient information (CVV2 code, billing address)? 
Tampering 
 Can someone falsify class availability information? 
 Can the class pricing information be changed or 
overridden in the process? 
 
Repudiation 
 Are the registrations time-stamped? 
 Are the payments time-stamped and verified? 
 Are the details of the registration process logged in a log 
file? 
Information Disclosure 
 Is the credit card data encrypted in accordance with PCI 
DSS standards when it is being transmitted to the 
system? 
 If someone starts to register for a class, but does not 
finish, does the process timeout, automatically log out 
the user, and redirect to a home screen after a period of 
inactivity? 
Denial of Service 
 Can someone key a SQL statement (SQL injection) into 
the registration form that could cause the system to 
crash? 
 Can one person accidentally register for a class several 
times, thus denying access to others because the class 
seems to be full? 
Elevation of Privilege 
 Is it possible for users to perform administrative 
functions or access other users’ records from this 
process? 
 




Once a threat is identified, discuss an appropriate 
countermeasure with stakeholders for mitigating the threat.  
For example, ensuring that sensitive information (such as 
cardholder data) is encrypted will help to ensure that it is not 
disclosed to unauthorized parties; validating all inputs will 
help to defend against SQL injection attacks.  These can 
either be logged in a table or in the SDL Threat Modeling 
Tool as shown in Figure 6. 
 
11. STEP FOUR: DOCUMENT SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
Security requirements elicited from conceptual modeling 
should be documented as part of a general requirements 
document for the system that contains all of the system’s 
requirements (Tondel et al. 2008). In doing so, security 
requirements will relate more clearly to functional 
requirements. Moreover, security requirements will gain 
visibility and be part of traceability and system testing 
efforts.  
Table 5 illustrates an abbreviated requirements 
document. In general, the document template used for 
functional requirements will also be suitable for 
documenting security requirements. Notice that each 
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Table 5. Systems Requirements Documentation with 
Security Measures Included 
 
12. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
This teaching case has illustrated how conceptual models 
commonly constructed during systems analysis and design 
may be extended to include security considerations. In doing 
so, information classification, regulatory requirements, and 
security threats can be analyzed early in the SDLC so that 
more effective security and privacy countermeasures may be 
built into software and process workflows. Modeling 
techniques illustrated in this case also provide a graphical 
means to communicate IS security and privacy risk within a 













For additional discussion, consider the following questions: 
 
1. How may security and privacy be integrated into other 
commonly used models, such as UML sequence, UML 
activity, or BPMN? 
 
2. Can regulatory requirements and industry standards be 
relied upon for identifying confidential information assets? 
Why or why not? 
 
3. Which stakeholders within an organization would you 
consult to gather information security and/or privacy 
requirements for an IS? Explain. 
 
4. What security and privacy related requirements or design 
elements have you worked with, even if you didn’t initially 




1 A portion and earlier version of this paper was presented at 
the 11th Security Conference in Las Vegas, NV in April 
2012. 
2 Breaches included in the 2013 annual Verizon report are 
from actual external forensics investigations, with data 
contributed from 18 sources, including the U.S. Secret 
Service and other international law enforcement agencies. 
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